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This paper considers the prospects for Turkish manufactured exports, now dominated by
simple labour-intensive products. The importance to Turkey of diversifying its export base has
risen with its EU free trade agreement, where it has advantages in labour-intensive exports but
where special preferences will vanish soon. As a high wage economy, Turkey has to compete
with low-wage countries in simple, low technology products. As a technologically lagging
economy, it has to compete against high technology European firms. Both are difficult, as there
remain important structural deficiencies in Turkish competitiveness. Strategic implications are
drawn in the conclusions.
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1.  Introduction
The importance to Turkey of expanding and diversifying its export base, particularly in
manufactured products, has risen with its free trade agreement with the European Union. It will
rise even further as the EU relaxes many remaining trade barriers with the rest of the world
(particularly Asian countries) in the next few years. Turkey has enjoyed a major advantage
against export-oriented countries in the developing world from its quota and tariff free access
for its labour-intensive exports to the European market. If Europe removes import quotas on
textile and clothing (with the demise of the Multi-Fibre Agreement by 2004) and liberalises on
products like automobiles and steel, Turkey will face a sharp increase in competitive pressures.
As a relatively high wage economy, it confronts difficult problems of competing with low-
wage countries in simple, low technology products. As a technologically lagging economy, it
will find it difficult to compete against high technology European firms in the most
sophisticated segments of manufacturing. In intermediate segments, it may find it difficult to
compete with advanced Asian NIEs, particularly where these countries have developed
substantial domestic capabilities, achieved scale economies or integrated themselves as global
suppliers within multinational networks.
This paper considers the position and prospects of Turkish manufactured exports by analysing
its technological structure. Section 2 provides the analytical background on the role of
technology in trade patterns of developing countries, and for considering the technological
structure of exports. Section 3 describes recent technological trends in world trade. Section 4
compares Turkey’s performance with the NIEs that are likely to be its fiercest competitors in
the near future. Section 5 discusses some structural determinants of technological upgrading.
Section 6 draws the conclusions.
2.  Analytical background: technology, trade and export structure
Theory does not give a significant role to technology in determining comparative advantage in
developing countries: some theories ignore this role altogether, while others consider it
important only for developed countries. Developed countries innovate and create the
technological advantages; developing countries merely import and (passively) use the
technologies suited to their factor endowments. The critical premise is that existing
technologies move across countries and enterprises without cost, risk, effort or externalities,
making the use of technologies an easy and economically trivial, process. Thus, technologyQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 2
plays no role in either determining their comparative advantage or differentiating their trade
patterns (since they all have equal access to technology). Developing countries emerge as a
homogenous and passive group of users of foreign technologies, with their comparative
advantages determined by factor endowments.
In Heckscher-Ohlin (H-O) theories, technology does not appear at all. Production functions are
identical across countries; all technology is fully diffused across firms and countries. Firms
automatically select the right techniques based on relative capital-labour prices. Once they
have made the choice (labour-intensive techniques for developing countries), they use the
technologies efficiently without lags, learning or effort. Since users automatically reach best
practice levels, there can be technical inefficiency only if governments intervene to distort
factor prices or prevent free trade.
Neo H-O theories, incorporating skills as a factor of production, continue to assume efficient
markets for technology and its costless and efficient application. The advantage of developing
countries lies in products with low-skill and labour-intensive technologies; in using these, once
more, there are no technological lags or costs. A new version (Wood, 1997) assumes that
capital is fully mobile and reduces the determinants of comparative advantage to two immobile
factors, skills and natural resources. Comparative advantage now depends on the ratio of skills
to resources: technology remains a permissive, and so irrelevant, factor.
In technology-based trade theories, comparative advantage depends upon ‘innovation’ –
discrete improvements to products or processes (shifts of the production function). The use of
and changes to existing technologies (reaching or moving along the production function)
remain costless. Innovators are primarily in industrial countries; developing countries receive
mature technologies from them and use them efficiently. As in H-O models, their comparative
advantage depends on relative wages and skills. Since these theories explicitly introduce
technology transfer, countries can realise or dynamise their advantages by facilitating
technology inflows, by opening their economies to trade, licensing and (particularly) foreign
direct investment.
Strategic or ‘new’ trade theories, based explicitly on imperfect markets, also concentrate on
advanced countries. Abstracting from factor endowments, they use scale and (later)
agglomeration economies to explain trade patterns (Krugman, 1986 and 1991). Its main scope
is intra-industry trade between industrial countries; in developing countries, trade remainsQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 3
mainly inter-industry, explained by H-O factor endowments. Interestingly, ‘learning’ appears
in some models as an explanatory variable, but it is really a form of scale economies over time:
passive, automatic and predictable learning-by-doing, dependent only on the volume of
production. It raises no policy issues apart from gaining first mover advantages. Some analysts
also note the existence of cumulative causation, externalities and path dependence as
determinants of location and competitiveness (Venables, 1996). However, this applies
primarily to agglomeration processes, not to technological learning in developing countries.
We should note, nevertheless, that this category of trade models has great potential for the
realistic analysis of technology and trade patterns in developing countries (below).
However, another branch of analysis, the ‘technological capability’ approach, takes a different
tack (for a review see Lall, 1999.a). This approach looks at micro-level learning in developing
countries in the evolutionary tradition of Nelson and Winter (1982), and argues that
technological effort can be a vital determinant of competitive advantage. Firms operate with
imperfect knowledge of technological alternatives and take time to master new technologies
(even if these are known to other firms). Thus, new technologies cannot be simply imported
and deployed at ‘best practice’ levels by developing countries. Finding technologies is a
difficult process. More important, once a technology is imported, there is a complex process
involved in learning to use it efficiently. The process is often costly, prolonged, risky and
unpredictable. It can involve externalities and coordination problems, and face failures in
information, capital, skill and other markets. The failures are particularly large in markets for
skills and technology, prone to widespread information deficiencies, uncertainty and
externalities.
The learning process is highly differentiated by technology. Some technologies are more
difficult to master than others because the learning process is longer and more uncertain,
involving greater effort and more externalities and coordination problems. More difficult
technologies also tend to offer greater potential for further learning and have greater scope for
the application of new knowledge. As countries grow, comparative advantage has to shift from
simpler to more complex technologies and from simpler to more difficult functions within
given technologies. Otherwise, competitiveness would erode with rising wages and exports
would stagnate.
In this approach, comparative advantage patterns can vary significantly between developing
countries with similar ‘endowments’ in the conventional sense. These patterns, and theirQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 4
evolution over time, depend on how effectively firms in each country access and master new
technologies, and cope with increasingly difficult learning over time. Traditional determinants
of comparative advantage are relevant – but through their effects on learning. For instance, H-
O relative factor costs do affect trade patterns, but only when the technologies concerned are
evenly spread over the trading partners. In developing countries, this is mainly true of
technologies with low scale economies, simple skills, short learning periods, limited
externalities and undifferentiated products. Since these also tend to be labour-intensive
technologies, H-O seems to ‘explain’ a substantial part of trade. However, a major element of
the explanation lies in the nature of the technology and the ease with which new entrants can
use it. Moreover, the capability approach suggests that there may be large differences between
countries in competence, dynamism and depth even in these technologies – the H-O approach
cannot draw such distinctions. The data show that there are in fact significant variations in
performance between labour-abundant countries in exporting simple manufactures, which are
explicable only by different national learning abilities.
Similarly, neo-HO theories are right in pointing to the importance of human resources are in
complex technologies. Skill availability, however, is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for efficiently using such technologies. Where mastering them involves costly, uncertain and
externality-prone learning, establishing an advantage requires that human resources be
combined with (and enhanced by) purposive technological effort. The degree of effort rises the
more advanced the technology and the more technology-specific the learning required.
Countries with similar skill endowments can thus vary in their export patterns, depending on
learning abilities and trajectories. Neo-technology theories also confuse necessary with
sufficient conditions. Access to foreign technologies or FDI is necessary to provide the initial
input into learning. It does not per se ensure that all labour-abundant countries attract similar
forms of FDI and build upon it with equal efficiency.
It is thus possible for countries with similar ‘endowments’ and openness to technology flows to
have different levels of competence in similar technologies and develop different patterns of
competence between easy and difficult technologies over time. One of the main deficiencies of
received trade theories is their inability to account for such differences. Random firm level
factors apart, they can be explained by differences national learning abilities.
What determines ‘national learning abilities’? A number of factors interact to determine what
and how well enterprises learn: macroeconomic conditions, trade and competition policies,QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 5
factor markets and institutions (Lall, 1996). In the presence of widespread failures in most
markets, the evolution of learning in developing countries depends on how these failures are
remedied. Thus, government policies on learning become basic determinants of comparative
advantage. Government interventions are not, as in much of neoclassical theory, necessarily
distorting – on the contrary, policies to remedy market failures are legitimate factors deciding
comparative advantage. The case is identical to that on the role of government in
industrialisation more broadly (Stiglitz, 1996). There is a valid case for policies to coordinate,
guide and subsidise learning, and to develop such factors as skills and technology where
externalities and information failures are particularly pervasive.
To simplify, successful strategies to promote learning and dynamic comparative advantage fall
under two broad headings. First, strategies to accelerate and guide learning by domestic firms,
by promoting infant industries, coordinating investments in related activities, overcoming
externalities, directing credit, and developing specific skills and institutions. Second, strategies
to rely on foreign direct investment to lead export growth and upgrading. Both entail strong
incentives to export and extensive use of foreign technologies but they differ in the agents of
technological learning. Korea and Taiwan are examples of the national-led strategy, Singapore
and Malaysia of the FDI-led strategy. Many countries have a mixture of both elements. With
the march of liberalisation and globalisation, there is a general tendency in the developing
world to move towards the FDI-led strategy in complex, technology-intensive exports.
This is understandable: MNCs have several advantages over local firms in coping with using
new technologies (‘new’, that is, to a particular location) and exporting the output. They have
mastered and used the technologies elsewhere (they may have created the technology in the
first place). They have large internal reserves of skill, technical support and finance to
implement the learning process. Their advantages in exporting include access to major markets,
established marketing channels and well-known brand names. They can transfer particular
components or processes from a production chain to a developing country and integrate it into
an international system. This is much more difficult for a local firm, not just because it may not
have the technological competence – it faces higher transaction and coordination costs in
integrating into a different corporate system.
While the FDI-led strategy has advantages, and is easier in that MNCs bring in the missing
factors needed for competitiveness, simply opening up to FDI is not a complete answer. It does
not absolve the government from helping develop local capabilities. MNCs transfer theQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 6
technologies suited to existing capabilities in host economies. Where skills, supplier
capabilities and technical knowledge are low, they import simple labour-intensive technologies
and create the capabilities to use these efficiently. They do not invest in creating more
advanced capabilities that need more sophisticated skills, or transfer advanced functions that
are efficiently centralised elsewhere. Only the government can upgrade the skill creation
system or boost supplier capabilities. If they do not, MNC export activity can remain
technologically stagnant at low levels. Moreover, there are market failures in the FDI process
itself. Effective promotion and targeting of investors can allow a country to attract higher
quality FDI, and so a more dynamic export structure, than a passive laissez faire policy.
2
More important, a national-led strategy can create broader, deeper and more flexible
capabilities than an FDI-dependent strategy, given the technologies used. The learning process
within foreign affiliates may remain curtailed and shallow compared to that in local firms. The
very fact that an affiliate can draw upon its parent company for technical information, skills,
technological advances and so on means that it needs to invest less in its own capabilities. This
applies particularly to such functions as advanced engineering or design, which MNCs tend to
centralise in industrial countries. As they grow and mature, developing countries can undertake
these functions efficiently; indeed, it is imperative that they do so to support their comparative
advantage.
To return to export structure, different analytical approaches yield different interpretations of
its significance. In approaches that ignore learning, export structure does not matter – it is only
the result of efficient choices. As endowments and factor prices change, the structure evolves
in response without cost, effort or risk – a movement along a given production function. As
countries grow and accumulate capital or skills, they switch to more capital- or skill-intensive
technologies. Any new activity is equally feasible, and in the absence of dynamic learning and
externalities, all structures are equally desirable. All export structures are completely flexible,
and equivalent in their welfare and growth implications. In other words, they do not matter
economically. The capability approach suggests, by contrast, that structures do matter for
export growth and evolution (Lall, forthcoming). Evolutionary and path dependent processes
mean that export structures are inflexible and difficult to change. Whatever the strategy
adopted, structural change involves the development of capabilities, which can be expensive
and slow; however, some structures have greater inherent dynamism.
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There are reasons to believe that export structures dominated by technology intensive products
have better growth prospects than do others.
3
§  Activities with the rapid product or process innovation generally enjoy faster growing
demand vis à vis technologically stagnant activities.
4 The most dynamic products in world
trade use complex and fast-moving technologies (below).
§  Technology-intensive activities are less vulnerable to entry by competitors compared to
low technology activities where scale, skill and technology requirements are low. A low-
technology export structure is a good starting point for a labour-surplus economy, but over
time, it can sustain export growth only by taking shares from other low technology
exporters. In relatively slow-growing final markets, this is possible but difficult. It needs
considerable technical effort, high levels of skill and, increasingly, entry into differentiated
segments of the market.
§  Ceteris paribus, technology-intensive activities lead to faster growth in capabilities and
higher quality capabilities. They offer higher learning potential and greater opportunity for
the continued application of science to technology. This can also apply to simple activities:
assembly of electronic components is more valuable for learning than assembly of
garments.
§  Capabilities in technology-intensive activities are more attuned to technological and market
trends, and so are more flexible and responsive to changing competitive conditions.
§  A technology-intensive structure is likely to have larger spillover benefits to other activities
and to the national technology system (Guerrieri and Milana, 1998).
There are qualifications to these propositions, taken up below. Let us first consider how world
exports are evolving.
                                                                                                                                                         
America see Spar (1998).
3 For theoretical analyses see Redding, 1999, Rodrik, 1996, and Young, 1991. These remain partial in their approach, taking
into account only the possibility of applying innovation or interacting with vertically linked activities.
4 Evidence on the faster growth of technology intensive industries and exports in 68 economies is provided in NSF (1998).
“The global market for high-tech goods is growing at a faster rate than that for other manufactured goods, and economic
activity in high-tech industries is driving national economic growth around the world. Over the 15-year period examined
(1980-95), high-tech production grew at an inflation-adjusted annual average rate of nearly 6 per cent compared with a rate of
2.4 per cent for other manufactured goods… Output by the four high-tech industries – those identified as being the most
research-intensive – represented 7.6 per cent of global production of all manufactured goods in 1980; by 1995, this output
represented 21 per cent.” (Chapter 6)QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 8
3. Technological Patterns in Exports
3.1 Classification of Technologies
This section provides a technological classification of manufactured export structures and
shows how different categories have evolved in world trade. There are many ways to
categorise manufactures by technology. The simplest and most commonly used it to distinguish
between broad groups of ‘high’ and ‘low’ technology activities based on their R&D intensity.
While relatively easy to understand and apply, this measure is highly aggregated; finer
differences are useful. An alternative measure, proposed among others by the OECD (1987), is
to distinguish between resource-based, labour-intensive, scale-intensive, differentiated and
science-based manufactures. This is more difficult since the analytical distinctions are not very
clear and there are overlaps between categories. The scheme here combines and extends both
the above categorisations:
§  Resource-based (RB): mainly processed foods and tobacco, simple wood products, refined
petroleum products, dyes, leather (not leather products), precious stones and organic
chemicals.
§  Low technology (LT): such as textiles, garments, footwear, other leather products, toys,
simple metal and plastic products, furniture and glassware.
§  Medium technology (MT): mainly automotive products, most industrial chemicals, standard
industrial machinery, and simple electrical and electronic products.
§  High technology (HT): fine chemicals and pharmaceuticals, complex electrical and
electronic machinery, aircraft and precision instruments.
In technological terms, RB products span a wide range. They may be simple and labour-
intensive (e.g. simple food or leather processing) or capital, scale and skill-intensive (e.g.
petroleum refining or modern processed foods). Since competitive advantages in these products
arises generally from the local availability of natural resources, they do not raise important
issues for competitiveness and are not considered in detail below.
LT products tend to have stable, well-diffused technologies mainly embodied in capital
equipment, low R&D expenditures and skill requirements, and low scale economies. Labour
costs tend to be a major element of cost and the products tend to be undifferentiated. Barriers to
entry are relatively low and competitive advantages tend to be based on price rather than
quality or brand names. There are, however, segments here with high skill/technology demandsQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 9
and differentiated products (e.g. fashion clothing), or with where capital-intensive technologies
(textiles); the cost of ‘raw’ labour is not an important competitive advantage here, though
technical innovation remains low.
MT products generally have complex, if not fast-changing, technologies. They have moderate
levels of R&D expenditure and tend to call for advanced engineering skills and large scales of
production. In engineering products in this group, there is a strong need for product design and
development capabilities as well as extensive supplier and subcontractor networks. Barriers to
entry tend to be high, not only because of capital requirements, but also because of strong
‘learning’ effects in operation, design, and, in certain products, product differentiation.
HT products, with advanced and fast-changing technologies and the complex skill needs, have
the highest entry barriers. The most innovative technologies, calling for large R&D investment,
can also require an advanced technology infrastructure and close interactions between firms,
and between firms and research institutions. However, many HT activities also have simple,
mature products or processes that use simple technologies, where low wages are an important
competitive factor.
Received trade theory predicts that developing countries will have the strongest comparative
advantages in LT and the weakest in HT products. It does not give any reason to distinguish
between developing countries, though semi-industrial countries like Turkey and other NIEs
should occupy (similar) intermediate positions between the least developed and industrial
countries.
3.2 World Trade Patterns
  Table 1 shows the distribution of world manufactured trade by these categories and their rates
of growth since 1980 (for further analysis, see Lall, 1998). The data reveal a tendency for
manufactured trade to shift from simple to more complex technologies. Rates of growth for
1980-96 are lowest for resource-based exports (5.7%), and rise progressively until they reach
11.6% for high technology products. From being the smallest category in world manufactured
exports 1980, HT surpasses RB by 1985 and LT by 1996. In the crisis year 1995-96, when
world trade slowed sharply (and precipitated the Thai crisis), HT and MT products kept
growing while the other categories declined. The bulk of trade remains in MT products, but
these also lose market share to HT over the period. Under present trends, HT products will
soon be larger than MT.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 10
  The data support the argument that a technology-based export structure is more conducive to
growth than others. If export structures are inflexible, dynamic export growth requires that
countries shift towards a structure that has a growing proportion of high-tech exports. There
are, however, some important caveats.
§  The generalisations apply only to countries with large industrial structures, in the
developing world mainly to the newly industrialising countries.
§  The generalisations on export growth potential do not apply across entire technological
categories – some low-technology products can enjoy rapid demand growth or have fast
technical progress, while some high-technology ones can be stagnant. This aggregation
problem can be taken care of by a highly disaggregated classification (see Abbott et
al.(1989) on the USA). However, this is extremely demanding of data; we cannot calculate
this for a cross-section of developing countries.
§  Even if products are correctly classified technologically, the same product can have
processes with different technological characteristics in different locations. For instance,
semiconductor exports can involve complex processes of design and fabrication in one
country and simple assembly and packaging in another. Much of the ‘high-technology’
exports of developing countries is in fact based on relatively simple, labour-intensive
assembly of complex components made in advanced countries (Lall, 1998, Yeats, 1998).
Ideally, the classification should be based on process rather than product, but this is not
Table 1: Evolution of World Manufactured Exports by Technological Categories
Shares (%)
1980 1985 1990 1995 1996
Resource based 19.5 19.3 15.5 14.0 13.7
Low tech 25.3 23.4 23.7 22.0 21.3
Medium tech 38.6 37.3 38.5 36.9 37.2
High tech 16.5 20.1 22.2 27.1 27.7
Rates of Growth (% p.a.)
1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-96 1980-96
Resource based 2.0 10.1 6.4 -0.2 5.7
Low tech 0.7 15.3 6.9 -0.9 6.9
Medium tech 1.6 15.7 7.7 3.0 7.8
High tech 6.3 17.4 13.0 4.5 11.6
Total 2.3 15.0 8.6 2.1 8.1
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade data.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 11
possible without detailed knowledge of local versus import content, technological inputs
and production processes in each country.
§  The argument is couched in terms of the technology-intensity of broad manufacturing
activities. While necessary for analysing trade data, this can be too general — the argument
can apply to technology-intensity within activities as well as across them, and export
prospects can improve by technology upgrading within each group. Italy has done well by
moving into the high quality end of clothing or footwear, where it is less vulnerable and
can afford high wages. However, given the trade data available, it is not possible to analyse
technology upgrading at the detailed product level. In any case, reaching the highest quality
levels may be more difficult in low-technology products than it is in technology-intensive
products. No developing country has been able to ‘do an Italy’ in the fashion industry: the
combination of skills, design tradition, collaboration, support services, technological effort
and equipment manufacture that form the Italian fashion system are extremely difficult to
reproduce.
§  The case for technology intensity overlooks the fact that growth in some products is based
upon the relocation of production from high to low wage countries, not a rapid rise in final
demand or innovation. This is the case with clothing, footwear and toys. Exports here have
been propelled by a restructuring of production, aided by falling transport costs, liberalising
policy regimes, and market access into major markets (as for Turkey in the EU). A
significant part of the relocation has been influenced by market allocation under quota
systems such as the Multi-Fibre Agreement for textiles and garments. Again, this does not
offset the case for technological diversification and upgrading. Low technology exports can
enjoy high growth during relocation, but the process will slow as restructuring matures and
technological and market growth reassert themselves.
  Table 2 shows the rates of growth of exports for developed and developing countries (we count
Turkey, Mexico and the four Asian Tigers as developing countries). Developing countries have
higher growth rates in each category, their lead over industrial countries increasing with
technological complexity (from 2.2 percentage points for RB to 11.3 points for HT). This is not
what we would expect given their traditional resource endowments or patterns of technological
effort – they are poorly endowed in skills and technology. Their highest share is in LT, but in
HT the share is only slightly lower, and growing much faster. The developed world’s smallestQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 12
loss is in RB, the largest in HT. In MT, which is now its main competitive strength, it still
holds 90% of world markets.
The main reason why developing countries have advanced further in high as compared to
medium technology exports is technological. MT products tend to be technologically
demanding, scale, skill and linkage-intensive products (automobiles, machinery or chemicals).
Reaching world levels of competence here requires long learning periods; engineering products
also need strong local supplier and subcontractor bases (increasingly so with just-in-time
production systems). Many products are ‘heavy’, with high weight-to-value ratios, and so are
uneconomical to place in distant low-wage areas. All these make it difficult to relocate many
MT activities to typical developing countries; only a few NIEs have the technological or
industrial base to meet the needs of efficient production. By contrast, in HT activities,
especially electronics, while core production processes and product design are complex, final
assembly is often low-skill and labour-intensive. This accounts for the rapid growth of HT
exports from the developing world. The competitive edge of industrial countries in innovation
and high skills has not eroded; the real erosion is in labour-intensive, ‘separable’ processes
across the manufacturing spectrum.
However, relocation does not explain all complex exports from developing countries. An
important, and increasing, part of their HT (and MT) exports relies on the deepening of local
capabilities, with significant domestic inputs of intermediates, capital goods, design and
research. In some cases, this applies to new export-oriented activities (as in Korea and
Taiwan), in others to import-substituting industries that have upgraded in response to trade
liberalisation (as in the automobile industry in Latin America). In all cases, however, it
involves local learning; and learning complex technologies tends to be more demanding of
Table 2: Growth Rates and Shares of Manufactured Exports by Technological
Categories, 1980-96 (%)














Total 8.1 6.6 14.0 7.4 9.8 23.0 13.3
RB 5.7 5.2 7.4 2.2 17.9 23.1 5.2
LT 6.9 5.9 12.6 6.7 15.0 34.4 19.4
MT 7.8 7.2 17.4 10.2 3.0 11.5 8.6
HT 11.6 9.8 21.1 11.3 8.1 29.8 21.7
Source: As previous table.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 13
skills, duration, costs, technical effort and inter-firm and inter-industry linkages than that in
LT. Thus, a number of developing countries are clearly building up
4. Comparing Turkey’s Export Performance
Let us now consider Turkish export performance and structures in comparison with the main
industrialising countries. Table 3 shows the values and growth rates of manufactured exports
for 13 leading developing countries.
5 The largest exporter is China, with $130 billion of
manufactured exports in 1996, followed by Korea and Taiwan with about $110 billion each
(Singapore’s own manufactured exports, as opposed to re-exports, are $69 billion, less than
those of Mexico). The smallest is Argentina; Turkey is next with $19 billion. The fastest
growing exporters over the 1985-96 period are Thailand, Mexico, Malaysia and Indonesia,
each with over 20 per cent annual growth. The slowest growing are Hong Kong, Brazil and
Argentina, followed by Turkey. Note that these few countries account for nearly 95% of the
developing world’s total manufactured exports in 1996. The analysis of export patterns from
developing countries thus finally devolves to explaining what drives exports from these few
NIEs.
                                                
5 According to national data, Philippines is also now a major exporter, with manufactured exports in 1996 of $17 billion,
larger than Argentina’s and growing at an average rate of 21 per cent per annum since 1990 (Lall, 1999.b). The engine behind
its growth is MNC-based electronics exports (dominated by semiconductors); this has enabled it to sustain rapid export growth
during, unlike its Asian neighbours. However, the UN database does not classify Philippine manufactured exports correctly,
allocating a very large proportion to ‘other transactions’, and we could not include it in the group of large exporters here.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 14
Table 3: Manufactured Exports by Leading Developing Countries
VALUES (US$ m.) GROWTH RATES (% p.a.)
Country 1980 1985 1990 1995 1996 1980-85 1985-90 1990-95 1995-96 1985-96
Turkey (a) 1,906 5,860 9,998 18,265 19,274 32.4 11.3 12.8 5.5 11.4
Hong
Kong
12,750 15,478 26,929 27,605 25,211 4.0 11.7 0.5 -8.7 4.5
Singapore
(b)
14,328 18,492 48,062 107,768 114,528 5.2 21.0 17.5 6.3 18.0
Korea 14,890 23,317 57,920 111,236 111,155 9.4 20.0 13.9 -0.1 15.3
Taiwan 18,214 28,295 62,211 103,987 108,514 9.2 17.1 10.8 4.4 13.0
Indonesia 3,827 3,572 11,091 25,906 28,639 -1.4 25.4 18.5 10.5 20.8
Malaysia 5,949 8,317 20,660 63,439 67,140 6.9 20.0 25.2 5.8 20.9
Thailand 2,572 3,794 16,563 43,697 42,995 8.1 34.3 21.4 -1.6 24.7
China (c) N/A 13,380 46,513 127,633 130,266 N/A 23.1 22.4 2.1 20.9
India 4,265 5,409 12,477 22,803 23,396 4.9 18.2 12.8 2.6 14.2
Argentina 3,113 3,501 6,342 10,962 11,098 2.4 12.6 11.6 1.2 11.1
Brazil (a) 10,556 14,599 19,036 27,935 28,556 8.4 5.5 8.0 2.2 6.3
Mexico
(a)
5849.5 8432.4 13533 64689.5 77,280 9.6 9.9 36.7 19.5 22.3
Total 98,216 152,448 351,333 755,922 788,050 13.3 18.2 16.6 4.2 16.1
All LDCs 102,347 188,203 408,684 826,079 835,081 13.0 16.8 15.1 1.1 14.5
Total %
LDCs
96.0% 81.0% 86.0% 91.5% 94.4%
Source: Calculated from UN Comtrade data.
Notes: (a) 1980 figures are for 1981; growth rates for 1980-85 are thus over the four years 1981-85.
(b)Singapore’s figure (unlike Hong Kong) includes re-exports, and involves some double counting.
However, re-exports are not large enough to alter the broad country distribution shown. Singapore’s
own exports (60% of its total) are $69 billion in 1996. Re-exports also do not significantly affect
Singapore’s growth rates, since their share of the total has changed little over time (data from
Singapore government Website).
(c) 1985 figure is for 1984; growth rate for 1985-90 is for 1984-90.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 15
Table 4: Structure of Manufactured Exports by Leading
Developing Countries (%)
1985 1996
RB LT MT HT RB LT MT HT
Turkey 22.0 62.3 13.4 2.3 17.5 63.9 12.8 5.7
Hong
Kong
2.1 64.3 14.2 19.3 4.4 52.7 14.0 28.9
Singapor
e
42.3 10.8 14.6 32.3 12.7 7.9 14.0 65.4
Korea 7.8 59.9 12.2 20.1 9.4 28.4 26.6 35.7
Taiwan 8.7 57.3 13.3 20.7 5.1 33.9 20.2 40.9
Indonesi
a
72.2 19.2 5.9 2.8 34.9 41.9 8.5 14.7
Malaysi
a
53.7 9.7 5.5 31.0 17.8 13.1 8.7 60.4
Thailand 42.1 38.2 6.6 13.1 14.5 35.6 13.5 36.3
China 11.7 57.1 21.8 9.4 9.8 56.3 13.4 20.6
India 40.3 46.1 10.6 3.0 31.1 52.3 13.1 4.4
Argentin
a
67.5 15.6 11.8 5.1 49.1 18.8 28.8 3.3
Brazil 32.6 33.3 27.1 7.1 25.6 31.8 34.0 8.6
Mexico 20.2 15.0 29.2 35.6 7.1 20.9 35.2 36.9
Note: China’s export structure for 1985 is based on 1990
figures.
While Turkish export performance is impressive on its own, it pales in comparison to that of
other NIEs. Turkish growth rates were particularly high in the early 1980s, but slowed
thereafter. In 1995-96, when world trade growth fell dramatically, the growth of Turkish
exports also slowed down but they did better than many other countries in the group.
Table 4 shows the technological structure of exports. Turkey has the weakest structure of the
group except for India. Nearly 64% of Turkish manufactured exports are accounted for by LT,
and another 18% by RB, products. MT and HT products together only contribute 19% of its
exports. At the other end, Singapore and Malaysia have nearly 80% from MT and HT products.
Even China, with its booming labour-intensive LT exports, has a much higher proportion of
high and medium technology products. The larger Asian Tigers with more depth and
diversification in their industrial structures, Korea and Taiwan, have just over 60% of their
exports from the MT and HT categories. Of the NIEs, these two countries have the largest
share of complex exports coming from domestic firms, with the highest ratio of local physicalQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 16
and technological content. Most others, with the exception of India, have medium and high
technology exports emanating from MNCs.
The Turkish export structure is not just technologically weak – it is stagnant. The combined
share of MT and HT products has risen by less than 3 percentage points over 1985-96, a small
rise in the share of HT largely offset by a decline in that of MT products. The extent and pace
of structural change in other exporters, particularly the dynamic East and Southeast Asian
economies and Mexico, is far more impressive. In view of the rapid changes in the structure of
world trade and the growing importance of technology-intensive products, this structural
stagnation is a major weakness. Table 5 gives the values and growth rates of each category of
exports for these countries.
Over the 1985-96 period as a whole, Turkey has its highest growth rates in HT exports, but this
reflects mainly its small starting base. In absolute terms, its high-tech exports in 1996 are a
small fraction (1-2%) of those from Singapore, Malaysia, Korea and Taiwan, and only about
4% of China’s. Otherwise, the highest overall growth comes from LT products followed by
MT products. Interestingly, in the 1990s, the latter group grows far more rapidly than the
former, but the values of medium technology products are still only one-fifth of low
technology products. There may be a sustainable structural shift under way but it still has a
considerable way to go before it affects the overall pattern.
  The figures thus suggest a serious structural problem in Turkish exports, with a dominance of
low technology products and little evidence of an ability to shift to more dynamic products.
Moreover, the growth of low technology exports (overwhelmingly textiles and garments) has
been due to a large extent to Turkey’s privileged access to the European market. While
producers have improved their equipment and quality significantly, and are investing in design
capabilities, they do not have a marked competitive edge over leading producers in East Asia.
Given that Turkey does not have a strong advantage in low wages in this industry,
6 it is
unlikely to sustain rapid growth once trade is fully liberalised by the year 2005. It is not clear
that Turkish exporters can establish a large enough quality lead over Asia to retain or expand
its export market share, since Asian producers are investing heavily in upgrading their
                                                
6 In 1995, the hourly remuneration of garment workers in Turkey was $1.52. While lower than the mature NIEs (e.g., Hong
Kong at $4.32, Taiwan at $5.18 and Korea at $3.29), it was higher than Thailand at $1.11, Philippines at $0.72, Indonesia at $
0.33, India at $0.29 and China at $0.25. Taking countries nearer to Europe, Egypt and Poland were cheaper than Turkey, at
$0.57 and $1.42 respectively, while Hungary ($1.68) and the Czech Republic ($1.55) were slightly more expensive (but with
higher skill levels and much greater proximity).QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 17
industries and design capabilities. While a significant part of Turkey’s textile exports may
survive, the industry is unlikely to be the dynamo of export growth it as been in the past.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 18
Table 5: Exports of Leading Developing Countries by Technological Categories
Values ($ million) Growth Rates (%
p.a.)
Values ($ million) Growth Rates (%
p.a.)












Resource Based Medium Technology
Turkey 1,291 1,757 3,369 6.4 11.5 9.1 788 922 2,471 3.2 17.9 11.0
Hong
Kong
326 864 1,109 21.5 4.3 11.6 2,205 4,315 3,541 14.4 -3.2 4.4
Singapor
e
7,823 12,321 14,530 9.5 2.8 5.8 2,703 7,493 16,091 22.6 13.6 17.6
Korea 1,821 3,223 10,451 12.1 21.7 17.2 2,838 8,886 29,540 25.6 22.2 23.7
Taiwan 2,470 3,759 5,517 8.8 6.6 7.6 3,750 10,911 21,895 23.8 12.3 17.4
Indonesi
a
2,578 5,670 10,008 17.1 9.9 13.1 211 663 2,430 25.8 24.2 24.9
Malaysi
a
4,470 6,491 11,959 7.7 10.7 9.4 460 1,336 5,862 23.8 28.0 26.0
Thailand 1,596 4,009 6,254 20.2 7.7 13.2 252 1,606 5,825 44.8 24.0 33.0
China
(a)
N/A 5,435 12,726 N/A 15.2 N/A N/A 10,142 17,403 N/A 9.4 N/A
India 2,179 4,266 7,270 14.4 9.3 11.6 574 1,508 3,070 21.3 12.6 16.5
Argentin
a
2,364 3,638 5,444 9.0 6.9 7.9 413 1,036 3,197 20.2 20.7 20.4
Brazil 4,755 4,950 7,320 0.8 6.7 4.0 3,951 5,566 9,698 7.1 9.7 8.5
Mexico 1,703 2,856 5,454 10.9 11.4 11.2 2,459 6,918 27,170 23.0 25.6 24.4
Low Technology High Technology
Turkey 3,650 6,874 12,325 13.5 10.2 11.7 132 445 1,108 27.5 16.4 21.3
Hong
Kong
9,956 15,146 13,286 8.8 -2.2 2.7 2,992 6,604 7,277 17.2 1.6 8.4
Singapor
e
1,990 5,523 9,045 22.7 8.6 14.8 5,976 22,725 74,863 30.6 22.0 25.8
Korea 13,978 29,171 31,519 15.9 1.3 7.7 4,680 16,641 39,645 28.9 15.6 21.4
Taiwan 16,211 28,759 36,756 12.1 4.2 7.7 5,864 18,781 44,345 26.2 15.4 20.2
Indonesi
a
684 4,500 11,986 45.7 17.7 29.7 100 257 4,215 20.9 59.4 40.6
Malaysi
a
811 3,166 8,792 31.3 18.6 24.2 2,577 9,667 40,528 30.3 27.0 28.5
Thailand 1,448 6,821 15,293 36.3 14.4 23.9 497 4,127 15,623 52.7 24.8 36.8
China
(a)
N/A 26,579 73,345 N/A 18.4 N/A N/A 4,357 26,792 N/A 35.4 N/A
India 2,492 6,251 12,239 20.2 11.8 15.6 165 452 1,019 22.3 14.5 18.0
Argentin
a
545 1,449 2,088 21.6 6.3 13.0 180 219 368 3.9 9.1 6.7
Brazil 4,857 6,727 9,093 6.7 5.2 5.9 1,036 1,793 2,445 11.6 5.3 8.1
Mexico 1,266 2,463 16,135 14.2 36.8 26.0 3,005 1,296 28,521 -15.5 67.4 22.7
Note: Chinese exports in 1985 were not allocated over the technological categories because of
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As noted, HT exports in many NIEs do not necessarily denote advanced technological
capabilities. A large part of HT exports come from MNCs assembling imported components in
special zones with little linkage to the rest of the economy. The exceptions are Korea and
Taiwan, and to some extent Singapore (which has been able to induce MNCs to locate
advanced technological functions locally and even invest in R&D activity). However, even in
MNC dependent exporters where local technological inputs are low, such as Malaysia,
Thailand or Mexico, there is evidence that local content is rising over time. Once high
technology export activity is firmly established, the high sunk costs of establishing production
capabilities seem to ensure its continuation. It is difficult to find examples of ‘footloose’
behaviour by MT and HT MNCs, in contrast to those in LT activities. How far MNCs will
continue to upgrade their exports is a different question; the answer depends on the ability of
host countries to upgrade their skills and supplier capabilities. At least till now complex
exports have continued to grow together with rising wages and technological complexity.
Turkish entrepreneurship is relatively well developed and the industrial sector has considerable
depth. However, it has not, in contrast to countries like Korea and Taiwan, been able to
mobilise itself to compete in advanced export activities. Nor has Turkey been able to induce
MNCs with long records of import substitution in the country to switch production massively
to exports, as in the automobile industry in Mexico, Brazil and Argentina. The boom in MNC
high and medium technology assembly based exports has largely passed Turkey by, and it is
not clear that it will be able to establish a foothold here. This suggests that it will be very
difficult for Turkey to launch dynamic export growth unless it is able to upgrade domestic and
foreign owned activities in complex technologies to world levels of efficiency. This will
require considerable technological learning. Are the main determinants of such learning in
place? Let us now look briefly at some such determinants: skills, technological activity and
FDI in Turkey and its NIE comparators.
5. Some Determinants of Export Upgrading
In a simplified framework, I suggested three sets of determinants of technological learning: the
incentive framework, factor markets and institutions (Lall, 1992). The incentive framework in
Turkey is now broadly conducive to raising efficiency. The manufacturing sector, fostered
under a regime of protected import-substitution with widespread state ownership and
intervention, now faces a liberal policy regime. The government has progressively lowered
trade barriers, eliminating all non-tariff restrictions, rationalising and reducing tariffs, andQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 20
recently entering a free trade arrangement with the EU. It has restructured the tax, incentive
and preferential credit systems, reformed state enterprises, liberalised the FDI regime, and
reduced domestic barriers to entry and growth. It has shifted its investment from competing
with the private sector to providing complementary infrastructure, particularly in transport and
communications. While the macroeconomic setting continues to be unstable, with high rates of
inflation, this has not deterred healthy levels of investment (27% of GDP in 1997) and
considerable restructuring of industrial activity.
However, this liberalised regime limits the ability of the Turkish government to exercise
industrial policy in support of new activities. Infant industry protection, the promotion of local
enterprises, selectivity on FDI and local content rules are no longer permissible, both under
WTO rules and as a consequence of its free trade agreement with the EU. It may true that
Turkey failed to make good use of industrial policy instruments before liberalization, and there
is no guarantee that it would do so in the future. There are other instruments of competitiveness
policy available, used widely by mature industrial countries – skill upgrading, science and
technology planning, enterprise technology support, R&D incentives, benchmarking, reducing
business costs, attracting FDI and so on. However, it is also true that several Asian NIEs
successfully used selective targeting to enter complex areas of technology and encourage
domestic enterprises (Lall, 1996). Turkey cannot turn the clock back on liberalization, but we
should not overlook the potential of more careful intervention.
What is the state of the other determinants? While we cannot review these in any detail, we can
follow the previous approach of benchmarking Turkish performance against the NIEs. We
focus on three important aspects of upgrading competitiveness: skill formation, R&D effort
and FDI attraction.
5.1 Skills
The critical importance of skills to competitiveness in manufacturing is widely accepted. The
move from one level or pattern of competitiveness to another requires changing the skill
creation system and the way that the productive system uses it, contributes to it and interacts
with it at all levels. The nature of technical change today implies even greater demands for
skills, and for new kinds of skill that respond flexibly to emerging industrial needs. How does
Turkey compare with other NIEs in this respect, and how does it match levels in mature
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It is difficult to compare ‘skills’ by country, even for manufacturing. Manufacturing skills can
arise from many sources, some difficult to quantify. The most readily available data are for
enrolments in formal education. This is a major source of skill creation but it is not the only
one; it ignores other forms of training (in particular firm-level training). Moreover,
comparisons of enrolments ignore differences in quality, definition, relevance, and completion
rates between countries. However, these are the only data available, and they do capture a
critical element of the skill base. Table 6 shows enrolment rates for secondary and tertiary
education, and for technical subjects in tertiary education, in Turkey, other major developing
countries and some industrialised countries.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 22
These data suggest that Turkey performs relatively well in human capital formation by
developing world standards. However, it lags well behind not just the main OECD countries
but also the larger Tigers, Korea and Taiwan, on all indicators of general and technical skill
creation (Korea leads whole world in technical enrolments at the tertiary level). The last
column of the table, with enrolments in the three main technology subjects as a percentage of
Table 6: Educational Enrolments (1995 or most recent year)
Country Enrolments Tertiary Level Technical Enrolments (numbers and as % of total
population)
















Turkey 64 20 39,327 0.07 25,276 0.04 134,408 0.24 199,011 0.35
Hong
Kong
N.A. 21 5,503 0.09 6,441 0.11 14,788 0.25 26,732 0.46
Singapor
e (a)
68 19 1,281 0.05 1,420 0.05 13,029 0.47 15,730 0.56
Korea 99 55 81,222 0.18 171,147 0.38 437,537 0.98 689,906 1.55
Taiwan 88 38 16,823 0.08 32,757 0.16 179,094 0.86 228,674 1.09
Indonesia 45 10 22,394 0.01 13,117 0.01 205,086 0.11 240,597 0.13
Malaysia 61 10 8,776 0.05 4,557 0.02 12,693 0.07 26,026 0.14
Thailand 49 21 77,098 0.14 1,292 0.00 105,149 0.19 183,539 0.32





India 49 6 869,11
9
0.10 . /. . /. 216,837 0.02 1,085,9
56
0.12
Argentina 67 36 69,727 0.21 . /. . /. 96,205 0.29 165,932 0.49
Brazil 46 11 46,322 0.03 92,701 0.06 149,660 0.10 288,683 0.19
Mexico 58 14 42,457 0.05 97,575 0.01 221,867 0.27 361,899 0.45
Some Industrialized Countries
Japan 98 29 59,030 0.05 20,891 0.02 488,699 0.39 568,620 0.46
France 106 50 304,09
3
0.53 . /. . /. 50,845 0.09 354,938 0.62
Germany 101 36 310,43
5
0.39 . /. . /. 389,182 0.49 699,617 0.88
UK 94 41 105,98
3
0.18 76,430 0.13 219,078 0.38 401,491 0.69
USA 97 81 496,41
5
0.19 525,067 0.20 801,126 0.31 1,822,6
08
0.70
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1997, UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook, various,
Government of Taiwan, Taiwan Statistical Yearbook 1994, and data from Ministry of Education,
Singapore.
Notes: . /. indicates that the category is included under another technical discipline.
(a) Singapore's tertiary enrolment figures exclude polytechnics, which enrol 27 of the age group. If
these were counted as tertiary institutions, this would greatly increase its tertiary enrolment figuresQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 23
the population, is of particular interest. It shows that Turkey is about 23% of the level reached
by Korea, 32% of Taiwan and 76% of Singapore.
In comparing skill and export structures across countries, it appears that the skill base in
Turkey is well in advance of the technological complexity of its manufactured exports.
Countries in Southeast Asia, with lower skill endowments, have been able to develop far more
technology-intensive export bases by specialising in simple assembly under MNCs. In this
sense, Turkey has ‘excess’ skills for the simple end of high technology activity, which it can
utilise by attracting high-tech FDI. However, if it is to match the Tigers in advanced
technological activity, especially in domestic enterprises, it seems to face significant skill
deficiencies. In comparison to European countries as well, the skill base is very weak, well
below levels needed to integrate with the region and use its advanced technologies as a full
partner (rather than a supplier of cheap labour).
5.2 Technological Activity
As with human capital, there is no easy way to compare technological activity across countries.
The available data on R&D are not an ideal indicator. Technological effort can take place in
many other ways, on the shop floor, in production engineering and process management, as
well as in the organisation of production and procurement. However, these are difficult to
measure. Formal R&D data are at least available on a roughly comparable basis across
countries, and can be taken as proxies for technological effort more generally. Moreover, their
relevance rises as countries mature industrially: basic technological activity is more
standardised and formal R&D more accurately reflects differences in technological effort.
Table 7 shows R&D in Turkey and comparator countries.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 24
Table 7: R&D Expenditures







Turkey 1995 0.4 0.12 11.1
Hong Kong 1995 0.1 N/A 23.0
Singapore 1994 1.1 0.69 294.0
Korea 1995 2.7 2.27 261.9
Taiwan 1994 1.8 1.00 198.0
Indonesia 1993 0.2 0.04 2.0
Malaysia 1992 0.4 0.17 15.6
Thailand 1991 0.2 0.02 5.5
China 1993 0.6 0.11 3.7
India 1995 1.1 0.14 3.7
Argentina 1996 0.3 0.05 24.1
Brazil 1985 0.4 0.08 14.6
Mexico 1995 0.4 0.09 13.3
Some Industrialized Countries
Japan 1995 3.0 2.01 1189.2
France 1995 2.3 1.13 574.8
Germany 1996 2.3 1.40 632.7
UK 1995 2.1 1.01 392.7
USA 1996 2.5 1.50 674.5
Sources: UNESCO, Statistical Yearbook 1995; national sources, OECD, Main Science and
Technology Indicators, 1997, and NSF (1998).
Notes: (a) R&D financed by productive enterprises (UNESCO), or by industry (OECD) as %
of GNP.
(b) Last available total R&D as % of 1995 income using income figures from World
Development Report 1997.
Formal technological effort is surprisingly low in Turkey. The most relevant indicator is
enterprise financed R&D as a percentage of GDP: here Turkey does better than China,
Indonesia, Thailand and the three Latin American countries. However, it lags well behind the
mature NIEs (Hong Kong apart) and the developed countries. Korea again leads not just the
developing world but also the developed world, while Taiwan comes just behind UK in the
global ranking. The strategies used to achieve these impressive results have to do with
industrial policy to stimulate learning in an export-oriented setting (Lall, 1996). In R&D per
capita, Turkey comes very low, even below Hong Kong, Malaysia and the three Latin
American economies in the table.
Turkish industry had practically no tradition of conducting R&D, preferring to rely passively
on imported technologies. Only 13 per cent of national R&D is financed by the private sector.
The government offers fiscal incentives for industrial R&D: in 1989, only 13 firms applied forQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 25
these incentives. Private R&D is far below levels in the advanced NIEs, and too low to support
sustained industrial competitiveness in advanced European markets. The lack of technological
activity has led to a significant brain drain of the best Turkish technical graduates. The need for
technology support is particularly pressing for the large number of SMEs that dominated
Turkish industry and that tend to lag in technology.
The bulk of R&D in Turkey, financed by the government, takes place in public research
institutes and universities.
7 This R&D has had few linkages to the industrial sector, and private
industry has been reluctant to collaborate with or contract research work to the public
laboratories. The pattern of public R&D does not match industry’s technological needs. The
technology infrastructure is generally inadequate to current industrial needs, and even more so
to the demands of a more dynamic export structure. The metrology, standards, testing and
quality system has been unable to provide the services needed by exporters, raising their costs,
constraining technology development and reducing their ability to compete internationally.
There is little private sector provision of technology services; there is no accreditation body in
Turkey to audit and certify independent testing bodies. There are few sources of technology
finance for private enterprises.
The government realises the need for a new strategy to stimulate and support technology
development in private enterprise. It has recently launched policies to improve tax incentives
for industrial R&D, direct procurement to encourage technological effort, and improve links
between industry and the science community. It is also responding to industry demand for a
more effective technology infrastructure, setting up a national metrological laboratory and
strengthening the standards body. at TÜBITAK. It is encouraging the public research
community to strengthen linkages with private industry, allowing public institutions to perform
research and consultancy work. It is setting up ‘technoparks’ at five universities to act as
business incubators, commercialise technology from universities and attract research work
from large companies.
Despite all these encouraging policy initiatives, however, Turkish industry remains essentially
a passive user of imported technologies. This strategy suits an economy at a low level of
industrial development, not one that needs to upgrade its export structure significantly, and
particularly one that lags in attracting export-oriented FDI (below).
                                                
7 This draws on the author’s review of a World Bank’s technology development project in Turkey.QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 26
5.3 FDI Inflows
Turkey has greatly liberalised its FDI regime and is now very welcoming to all sorts
international investors, particularly in export-oriented activities. However, as Table 8 shows, it
has not enjoyed very large inflows in relation to gross domestic capital formation. The trend
rate is between 1.5 and 2 per cent, well below most NIEs. The actual values since 1991 range
between $600 and $900 million annually, with no clear indication that they are growing (they
peaked in 1995 and declined over the following two years).
Table 8: Inward FDI as Percentage of Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation
1986-91 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
WORLD 3.6 3.3 4.4 4.5 5.6 5.6
Regions
Developed 3.5 2.6 3.0 2.8 3.9 3.6
Western
Europe
5.6 5.3 6.1 5.4 7.2 5.9
All
developing
3.4 4.2 6.1 7.6 7.4 8.7
North Africa 2.5 4.4 4.4 6.6 3.2 3.3
West Asia 0.8 0.6 2.8 1.2 -0.6 0.2
L. America 5.3 7.6 6.4 8.9 9.8 12.8
S. & E. Asia 3.6 4.5 6.5 7.9 7.5 8.3
Central, East
Europe
0.1 1.1 7.4 4.7 10.2 7.5
Developing Countries
Turkey 1.8 2.3 1.4 1.4 2.0 1.6
Hong Kong 10.7 7.4 5.3 5.1 4.9 5.2
Singapore 37.6 12.4 23.0 35.0 28.9 27.5
Korea 1.3 0.6 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.3
Taiwan 3.6 1.8 1.8 2.5 2.7 3.2
Indonesia 2.3 3.9 4.3 3.8 6.7 8.5
Malaysia 14.7 26.0 20.3 14.9 11.0 11.1
Thailand 5.5 4.8 3.6 2.3 2.9 3.0
China 2.9 7.4 12.2 17.3 15.0 17.0
India 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.4 2.4 2.9
Argentina 5.6 10.6 5.4 5.5 9.5 9.7
Brazil 1.6 2.9 1.5 1.9 3.5 7.5
Mexico 8.3 6.4 5.9 13.5 20.6 14.2
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1998.
Much of the FDI in most countries in the table has been highly export-oriented, and accounts
for the bulk of their complex exports. The exceptions are Korea and Taiwan (in particular
Korea) among the successful high-tech exporters, India among the less successful ones. The
former two have export-oriented MNCs, but the engines of export growth are local firms. Both
deliberately restricted FDI to build up domestic technological capabilities and encourageQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 27
domestic firms to develop sophisticated exports. India also restricted FDI but failed to offer an
export-oriented trade regime and to build up competitive domestic capabilities. Most of its
recent FDI inflow has gone into domestic market oriented and infrastructure activities (Lall,
forthcoming).
Turkey is similar to India in this respect: it has attracted relatively little FDI (even less that
India now) and, more significantly, its recent efforts to increase FDI have failed to bear fruit. It
is difficult to say, without further research, why this is so. To attract the export-oriented FDI,
particularly in HT activities, a developing country today has to offer a skilled and disciplined
work force with modern technical skills. This has to be supported by excellent infrastructure,
streamlined procedures, low business transaction costs, inputs at world market prices, national
treatment for MNCs and stable, transparent policies. It also needs effective FDI promotion,
with well-directed targeting, incentives and the ability to assess and meet the needs of high-
technology investors. Turkey has some but not all these attributes. Its political and social
uncertainties may deter MNCs from committing themselves to sourcing components from
Turkey. Its industrial infrastructure may not match emerging competition from Eastern Europe.
The strong entrenched position of local business groups, and hidden business costs, may act as
a disincentive to prospective investors. More significantly, its FDI targeting and promotion
may be inadequate to change past perceptions and attract dynamic MNCs.
6. Some Conclusions on Strategy
This paper has outlined important issues concerning the nature of exports and comparative
advantage in the developing world, and has illustrated these with reference to Turkish export
performance. If the technological capability approach has any validity, there are grounds for
concern about Turkey’s manufacturing competitiveness. The structure of exports is extremely
weak, and has barely upgraded over time. Much of the recent export growth has come from
low technology products, spurred by privileged access to the European market rather than
global competitiveness. Its performance has been respectable, if slowing over time; it may not
last even at this level after more radical trade liberalization.
If Turkey’s export structure is to move significantly into medium and high technology
activities, which of the strategies followed by the NIEs seems most feasible?
The Mexican strategy of high-technology growth through assembly for a giant and rich
neighbour, with minimal value added, does not appear feasible for Turkey. It lacks theQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 28
geographical proximity to Europe, and there are cheaper competing locations (some, as in East
Europe, with higher skill levels and lower transport costs). What about the Malaysian strategy
of MNC-based high technology exports for distant markets? This has greater value added than
the maquiladoras of Mexico, and does not depend on privileged market access. While this
appears attractive, it may not be practical for Turkey. Asian NIEs, starting with low wages,
have seized ‘first mover’ advantages in many electronics assembly activities, becoming major
sourcing centres for leading multinationals. Turkey may find it difficult to take market share
from them. However, with its good skill base, it may be able to carve a niche by attracting
assembly and component supply for the European market.
Turkey needs elements of strategy from Korea and Taiwan to upgrade the capabilities of the
local industry (particularly small and medium sized enterprises). Its large business houses are
in close touch with international markets, but have weak technological capacity in advanced
manufacturing activities.  SMEs are technologically weak and find it difficult to access
information on foreign markets, designs and prices. Both need assistance in upgrading their
technology and benchmarking their productivity against firms in Europe and the NIEs. The
base of skills available for upgrading is reasonable and apparently under-utilised. In the longer
run, however, the education base needs improvement. Specialised industrial and in-firm
training are likely to lag behind competitors. Perhaps the most difficult longer-term challenge
for the government is to raise R&D capabilities in industry.
Given that Turkey now lacks some important tools of industrial policy, it can still attempt to
create the right ‘learning conditions’ by targeting these supply-side measures towards dynamic,
technology intensive activities and targeting high-tech MNCs. Here Korea, Taiwan and
Singapore can offer important lessons (Lall, 1996). Each has long used strategic technology
plans to direct its spending on technology support.
8 Government funding and incentives have
stimulated private R&D and guided it to dynamic export activities. Skill creation has been
similarly geared to the specific needs of new technologies and major exporters. The
governments have mounted several measures to strengthen technological links between science
institutions and industry. SMEs are supported by a battery of measures to raise productivity
and use the latest technologies. Export marketing receives extensive government support.
                                                
8 On the strategic tools used by Korea and Taiwan to promote their semiconductor industry, see Mathews and Cho
(forthcoming). One valuable tool used by the Taiwanese government to promote competitiveness in high technology products
was to set up ‘innovation alliances’ between local firms and technology institutions. This has proved very effective in allowing
firms to innovate, negotiate with foreign firms and enter export markets. Some successful exports are the PowerPCQEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 29
Singapore’s FDI targeting and promotion is widely regarded as one of the best in the world
(along with that of Ireland in Europe).
One final word: Turkey looks mainly to Europe for its role models. While this is
understandable, it would be wise for it to cast its net more widely. Asia offers many valuable
lessons in export and technology development, as do some Latin American countries. In many
ways, Turkey remains a developing country. Liberalization has so far had beneficial effects,
mainly by allowing its low technology activities to exploit their static comparative advantage
in (sheltered) European markets. This advantage is bound to run out soon. A shift into more
technology-intensive activities is imperative, and it may not come automatically. The
capability approach suggests that it needs a clear strategy, not a passive reliance on free
markets, to improve its competitive position.
                                                                                                                                                         
microprocessor for IBM, videophones, laptop computers, laserfax, digital switching devices and ‘smart cards’. See Poon and
Mathews (1997).QEH Working Paper Series QEHWPS47 Page 30
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